On the Symbolic Generalization of Likes and Dislikes
Evaluation is at the core of our psychological lives. It not only guides our judgments and decisions, but often dictates how we treat our friends and family, as well as other individuals and groups. Evaluations bias what we remember, influence the politicians we vote for, musicians we listen to, and products we consume. We therefore need to understand how, when, and why evaluations are established and what factors play a role in their change.
One such factor -the generalization of evaluations -may explain why evaluative learning can exert such a powerful and far-reaching influence on behavior. Evaluative generalization refers to the fact that once evaluative responses towards a focal stimulus are established or changed, people often emit similar responses to non-focal stimuli that are related to that focal object. Unlike (evaluative) conditioning effects (see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) , these changes in liking are not due to the mere spatio-temporal relation between focal and non-focal objects but rather to a different type of relationship. Most research on evaluative generalization can be divided into one of two categories: perceptual or symbolic.
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Evaluative Generalization Along Perceptual Dimensions
The generalization of evaluative responses is often based on the fact that focal and non-focal stimuli share perceptual properties with one another. This type of generalization plays a role in many social, cognitive, and clinical phenomena. Take the resemblance effect in social psychology: evaluations of strangers are often influenced by how much they physically resemble people we already know. Such generalizations tend to occur automatically without the perceiver's awareness or intent, increase in strength as the level of similarity between faces grows, and influence our judgments and decision making (see Gawronski & Quinn, 2013; Verosky & Todorov, 2010; Zebrowitz, White, & Wieneke, 2008) . Now consider the 'guilt-by-association' effect: evaluations of one individual can generalize to an entire group whenever they share physical properties such as age, ethnicity, or gender (Hütter, Kutzner, & Fiedler, 2014) . The very same goes for novel consumer products: a mere physical similarity between a known (valenced) object and an unknown (neutral) object is often enough for valence to transfer from one to the other (e.g., Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004) . In clinical psychology, we have known since Watson and Rayner (1920) that conditioned fears towards an aversive stimulus (e.g., white rat) readily generalize to perceptually related (e.g., white and furry) stimuli. Recent work indicates that this is also true for anxiety and chronic pain (e.g., Lissek et al., 2014; Meulders & Vlaeyen, 2013) .
Evaluative Generalization Along Symbolic Dimensions
Evaluative responses can also generalize when focal and non-focal stimuli are symbolically related. Relatively early on in their development, humans acquire the ability to generate, use, and respond to symbols in the world around them (Deacon, 1997) . Whereas perceptual generalization effects are -by definition -heavily dependent on the degree of physical overlap between stimuli, generalizations based on symbolic relations are often free from any such constraints. These relations allow stimuli to be connected in a near infinite number of ways and for the psychological properties of one stimulus to influence how people behave towards others. For instance, imagine you are told that a brown sticky substance is poisonous and afterwards learn that this substance is similar to a green liquid, and that the liquid is similar to a white gas (Brown Solid-Similar-Green Liquid-Similar-White Gas). You may generalize what you have learned about the first stimulus (solid) to the last stimulus (gas), even though they share no physical properties.
Many phenomena in psychological science may qualify as symbolic evaluative generalization effects. Person perception is a prime example: personality traits that define one individual often influence stereotypes and evaluations of others even when those individuals share no physical similarity (e.g., Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998) . In marketing, prior evaluations of one consumer product (e.g., Sony television) frequently bias evaluations of other products that are released under the same brand name (e.g., Sony headphones) (i.e., the 'brand extension' effect; Ratliff et al., 2012; Völckner & Sattler, 2006) . This can occur despite the fact that the products are physically dissimilar and the individual has no prior experience with the novel items released under that brand name. Hence the symbolic relation between the stimuli (i.e., the fact that they are both 'Sony' products) may account for this finding.
The ability to symbolically relate stimuli drastically expands the remit of evaluative generalization and enables humans to transfer what they have learned about the evaluative properties of one stimulus to another even when they are physically unrelated. Unlike perceptual generalization effects (where physical overlap is crucial), symbolic relations can be established in many different ways.
A Systematic Investigation of Symbolic Evaluative Generalization
Despite the importance of symbolic evaluative generalization, there has been little systematic research on this topic, both at the conceptual and empirical levels. At the conceptual level, we put forward the proposal that symbolic evaluative generalization has occurred if three conditions are met: (1) a change in liking took place, (2) that is an instance of generalization, and (3) that is due to a symbolic relation between stimuli. Hence, symbolic generalization excludes (1) changes in non-evaluative properties (e.g., arousal) or specific emotional responses (e.g., fear), (2) changes in liking that are instances of conditioning (i.e., due to a direct or indirect relation between the spatio-temporal properties of the focal and non-focal stimuli) 2 , and (3) changes in liking that are due to perceptual relations between focal and non-focal stimuli. Importantly, at the empirical level, virtually all studies on symbolic evaluative generalization fail to meet one or more of these criteria. For instance, some studies fail to control for perceptual overlap between stimuli (e.g., the focal [Reemolap] and non-focal items [Bosaalap] often share the same name-ending; Ranganath & Nosek, 2008) . Others fail to exclude an impact of direct or indirect spatio-temporal relations (e.g., Ratliff et al., 2012) whereas still others focused on specific emotions rather than liking (e.g., Bennett, Meulders, Baeyens, & Vlaeyen, 2015) . Past work has also tended to focus on a single type of symbolic relation (i.e., similarity). Generalization is usually based on the fact that one brand, individual, or group is similar to another. Yet stimuli can be related in many other (nonsimilarity based) ways which determine both the direction and magnitude of the generalization effect. Given the profound impact that relation type has on changes in liking for focal stimuli (e.g., Unkelbach & Fiedler, 2016; Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014) , it is somewhat surprising to see that this factor has not yet been taken into account. In short, although symbolic evaluative generalization seems to play a role in many different phenomena, previous research on this topic is limited in several ways.
The Current Research
This lack of systematic research might (in part) be due to a lack of procedures to study this phenomenon, most prominently, procedures that control for the impact of perceptual relations and direct pairings. In this paper, we introduce a set of procedures that are designed to establish symbolic evaluative generalization. Our procedures not only allow one to minimize the impact of perceptual similarity and direct pairings but also provide a way of manipulating how stimuli are related. Using these procedures, we conducted a series of studies that together provide the first systematic investigation of symbolic evaluative generalization effects.
Across six experiments we examined the impact of symbolic similarity, opposition, and comparative relations on explicit and implicit evaluations. All studies followed the same basic format which we will briefly preview here. We first established two symbols as contextual cues meaning 'Same' and 'Opposite' (Experiments 1-4) or 'More than' and 'Less than' (Experiments 5-6). During a subsequent training phase, we presented these cues onscreen along with two other stimuli. By reinforcing the selection of a certain cue in the presence of specific stimuli we set out to achieve two outcomes: (a) establish a positive or negative valence for a focal stimulus and (b) relate this focal stimulus to other non-focal group members (Experiments 1-2), fictitious brand products (Experiment 3-4), or potential prizes (Experiment 5-6) (see Figures 1 and 2 ). We then indexed evaluative responding using self-report, indirect (Implicit Association Task [IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998 ], Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure [IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010] , evaluative priming), approach-avoidance, and behavior choice tasks. Using a variety of indices allowed us to test the generality and robustness of our findings. Taken together, our studies provide new information on how the type of relationship between stimuli can moderate the direction and/or magnitude of generalization effects while controlling for perceptual overlap as well as direct or indirect pairings.
Experiments 1-4
Experiments 1-4 set out to model symbolic evaluative generalization in the context of social psychology (groups of novel stimuli [Pokémon] : Experiments 1 and 2) and consumer psychology (Brands: Experiment 3-4). 3 We first established two symbolic similarity relations between focal and non-focal stimuli (Relationship 1: Pokémon 1-2-3, Relationship 2:
Pokémon 4-5-6). Thereafter we established a valence for the two focal stimuli and tested for evaluative generalization using self-report and implicit measures (Experiment 1: IAT;
Experiment 2: IRAP; Experiment 3: IAT and an evaluative priming task; Experiment 4: IAT and an approach-avoidance task).
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If symbolic generalization occurs then two outcomes should be observed. First, a valence established for a focal stimulus (e.g., Pokémon 1) should generalize to non-focal stimuli (e.g., Pokémon 2 and 3) despite the fact that the latter share no physical resemblance to Pokémon 1, nor were they ever paired with valenced images in the past. Second, the direction of evaluative change should depend on the symbolic relationship established between the focal (Pokémon 1) and valenced stimuli, as well as the focal and non-focal stimuli. If Pokémon 1 is opposite to positive images, then it should be, along with Pokémon 2 and 3, evaluated negatively. The reverse should be true for Pokémon 4, 5, and 6. Importantly, by manipulating the nature of the symbolic relation we demonstrate that these effects cannot be due to mere stimulus pairings. If the observed changes in liking were merely due to the pairing of stimuli then we would expect an assimilative effect, such that the non-focal stimuli should always acquire the same valence as the valenced stimuli that the focal stimuli were originally paired with. A mere pairings account would be hard-pressed to explain how the 3 We employed Pokémon characters in our studies for several reasons. They have already been used in social psychology research as a means to successfully study attitude formation via conditioning (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001) . During piloting it was also relatively easier to select a series of Pokémon that were neutral in valence compared to other stimulus sets (e.g., human faces). These stimuli were also perceptually different to one another which limits the possibility of perceptual generalization as an alternative explanation for our findings. 4 As outlined above we established symbolic relations using contextual cues that were established in the laboratory. We decided on our procedures for two reasons. First, these procedures are widely used in the learning psychology literature and have consistently proven effective in generating the types of symbolic relations we were interested in (for a review see . Second, by establishing the meaning of the contextual cues in the laboratory, and by using these cues to relate previously unknown (abstract) stimuli with a single psychological property (valence), we sought to ensure tight experimental control over symbolic evaluative generalization.
valence of the non-focal stimuli was opposite to that of the valenced stimuli that focal items were paired with.
Method
Participants and Design. A total of 59, 64, 111, and 61 students participated in exchange for either a chocolate bar, course credits, or a monetary reward (Experiment 1:
mean age = 21, SD = 6; Experiment 2: mean age = 20, SD = 6; Experiment 3: mean age = 20, SD = 4; Experiment 4: mean age = 21, SD = 5). The raw data, experimental scripts, and analysis files are available on the Open Science Framework website (https://osf.io/r6bgw).
Sample size for all experiments was determined before any data analysis and was based on the availability of participants at the time of data collection. Final sample size (after participant exclusions noted below) allowed us to reliably observe an effect of η The block order of the indirect procedure and evaluative task order were counterbalanced across participants. In Experiment 3, we also counterbalanced the type of relation between focal stimulus and valenced stimuli (Opposition/Similarity) as well as order of indirect procedure (IAT/evaluative priming task).
Materials.
In Experiments 1 and 2, six Pokémon characters were selected to serve as focal and non-focal stimuli (i.e., yamask, unown, trubbish, klink, tynamo, and roggenrola) while five pleasant and five unpleasant images served as valenced stimuli. Procedure. Participant provided informed consent. Overall there were three phases:
contextual cue training, relational training, and evaluative measures (see Figure 1) .
Contextual Cue Training.
Training consisted of two types of trials designed to establish one symbol as meaning 'Same' and another meaning 'Opposite'. On each trial, two pictures that were similar (e.g., two images of dogs) or opposite (e.g., arrows pointing up and down) were presented at the top along with two symbols at the bottom of the screen (see Figure 2 ). On 'similarity' trials, choosing the "Same" symbol in the presence of two pictures that were similar caused "Correct" to appear for 1000ms. All stimuli then disappeared and the next trial began after 1000ms. Selecting the incorrect symbol caused "Incorrect" to appear.
Feedback remained until participants emitted the correct response. All stimuli then disappeared and the next trial began after 1000ms. A broadly similar pattern of responding was required for 'opposition' trials. Critically however, selecting the 'Opposite' cue when shown two pictures that were opposite (e.g., fire/water, black/white) caused 'Correct' to appear whereas selecting the 'Same' cue caused 'Incorrect' to appear.
In Experiments 1-3, participants completed a minimum of one and a maximum of three blocks of trials. The number of trials within a block could vary from 20 to 80 depending on task performance. Within each block the location of the two symbols and trial-type was varied in a quasi-random order. Participants who emitted twenty consecutively correct responses moved on to a block of test trials. Test trials were identical to training trials.
Note that the nonsense words used in Experiment 3 were actually the names of regional Belgian beers. Critically, pre-testing indicated that no-one was familiar with these names prior to the study.
However, novel images were presented and no feedback was provided. Successfully completing the test block required the correct cue be selected on 20/24 trials. Failure to do so resulted in re-exposure to training and testing until either (a) the mastery criterion was met or (b) three training and testing sequences were completed. Attaining the mastery criteria resulted in progression to relational training while failure resulted in participants being thanked, debriefed, and dismissed. Pokémon 1 and 2 (or Pokémon 4 and 5) were displayed together, selecting the 'Same' cue caused "Correct" to appear. When an incorrect response was made error feedback appeared and progression required the correct cue to be selected. Alternatively, when Pokémon 1 and 5, or Pokémon 2 and 4 were presented together, selecting the 'Opposite' cue was reinforced and the 'Same' cue punished. Finally, in addition to the four relations, and to ensure that the cue meaning ('Same' and 'Opposite') remained salient throughout the task, cue training trials were also interspersed within each block. 7 In Experiment 4, contextual cue training blocks consisted of a fixed set of 24 trials. Participants completed a minimum of one and a maximum of four such blocks (depending on their accuracy criteria). They then proceeded to a test block of 24 trials and progressed to the relational test phase regardless of test performance. Relational training blocks also consisted of blocks of 24 trials. Participants were exposed to a minimum of one or a maximum of four such blocks in each of the four relational training stages (each stage was followed by a test block). Failure to pass a relational test led to re-exposure to stages 3 and 4 and another relational test. Thereafter participants proceeded to the evaluative measures regardless of performance. cue resulted in "Correct" being displayed whereas selecting the 'Same' cue produced error feedback. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the type of relation between valenced and focal stimulus, such that half the participants were reinforced for relating the two as same whereas the other half were reinforced for relating them as opposite. In Experiment 4, all participants were reinforced for relating stimuli as similar to one another. In each case, progression required that participants emit 20 correct responses on a training block followed by at least 20 out of 24 correct responses on a test block. Failure to do so resulted in re-exposure to the task; failure after three training and testing blocks resulted in being thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
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Evaluative measures. In the IAT of Experiment 1, there were seven blocks. The first block (20 practice trials) required participants to sort images of two Pokémon into their respective categories, with one (e.g., Pokémon 3) assigned to the left ('E') key and the other (e.g., Pokémon 6) with the right ('I') key. In the second block (20 practice trials) they assigned negative words to the 'Bad' category using the left key and positive words to the 8 Note that half of the participants completed a single session of contextual cue and relational training while the other half returned for a second session of training (and the evaluative measures) on the following day. We adopted this design in order to determine if the amount of training provided influenced the strength of evaluative responding. This factor was not found to do so -and as such -was not included in the analyses reported below.
'Good' category using the right key. Blocks 3 and 4 (20 and 40 trials, respectively) involved a combined assignment of target and attribute stimuli to their respective categories (e.g., Pokémon 3 and 'negative' words with the left key and Pokémon 6 and 'positive' words with the right key). The fifth block (20 trials) partially reversed key assignments, with Pokémon 3 now assigned to the right and Pokémon 6 with the left key. The sixth and seventh blocks (20 and 40 trials respectively) required participants to categorize Pokémon 6 with negative words and Pokémon 3 with positive words. Eight positively and negatively valenced adjectives were employed as one set of attribute stimuli (happy, love, pleasure, fun, joy, kind, friendly, wonderful vs. sick, horrible, disgusting, sad, terrible, awful, pain, vomit) while four images of Pokémon 3 and 6 at different orientations served as the second set. The IAT in Experiment 4 was similar with the exception of the stimuli employed. Brand 3 and 6 now served as category and attribute stimuli whereas the following valence stimuli served as attributes of the 'Good' and 'Bad' categories (fantastic, nice, brilliant, and pleasant vs. horrible, terrible, awful, unpleasant).
The IRAP of Experiment 2 consisted of a minimum of one and a maximum of three pairs of practice blocks followed by a fixed set of three pairs of test blocks. Each block consisted of twenty four trials that presented one of two stimuli (either Pokémon 3 or 6) at the top of the screen, a second stimulus (positive or negative adjective) in the middle of the screen, and two response options ("True" or "False") at the bottom of the screen (see Figure   4 ). This stimulus configuration resulted in four "trial-types": Pokémon 3-Positive; Pokémon 3-Negative, Pokémon 6-Positive, and Pokémon 6-Negative. Trial presentation and onscreen location of the two response options was varied in a quasi-random order. During one block of trials they had to respond as if Pokémon 3 was negative and Pokémon 6 was positive, whereas during a second block, they had to respond the opposite way, acting as if Pokémon 3 was positive and Pokémon 6 was negative. These two response contingencies were alternated across successive blocks. The IRAP commenced with a pair of practice blocks. Participants progressed from the practice to the test blocks when they met accuracy (at least 75% accuracy) and latency criteria (median latency of less than 2000ms) on a successive pair of practice blocks. Failure to meet these criteria resulted in re-exposure to another pair of practice blocks until those criteria were either achieved or a maximum of four pairs of practice blocks were completed. Test blocks were similar to practice blocks with the exception that no performance criteria were required to progress from one block to the next.
The evaluative priming task of Experiment 3 consisted of one practice and two test blocks. The non-focal stimuli directly (Brand 2 and Brand 4) or indirectly (Brand 3 and Brand 6) related to the focal stimuli served as primes while four positive and four negative adjectives served as targets. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross (500ms) followed by a brand name (200ms). A target stimulus was then presented and remained onscreen until a response was emitted. The next trial began after a 1000ms ITI. The task began with six practice trials during which one of the brand names was randomly assigned as a prime and either a positive or negative word as a target. Two blocks of 32 test trials were then administered during which each of the four primes were randomly presented with one of the four positive and one of the four negative targets. The order of these trials was randomized within each block. For the evaluative priming task, the four non-focal brands served as prime stimuli (Brands 2, 3, 5, and 6) while four positive (delicious, tasty, yummy, nice) and four negative words (disgusting, rotten, sick, vomit) served as target stimuli.
Self-reported ratings were assessed in all experiments using a series of Likert scales.
Each Pokémon character or Brand was presented once and participants provided their general impression of the stimulus using a scale ranging from -4 (Negative) to +4 (Positive) with 0 as a neutral point in Experiments 1-3 or -5 to +5 in Experiment 4.
Approach-avoidance task. Participants performed a manikin task (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001 ) that was designed to measure participants' approachavoidance tendencies towards Brand 3 and Brand 6. In this task, participants are asked to move a manikin representing themselves on the screen by pushing the up or down arrow keys of the keyboard. Evidence suggests that this task triggers spontaneous distance-regulation tendencies to valenced stimuli (Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2010) and produces stronger effects than many other variants measuring approach-avoidance tendencies (for evidence see . Before performing the task, participants were shown Brand 3 and Brand 6 and they were asked to indicate which of the two brands they liked the most. Participants were then instructed that they would perform a task in which they would see these two brands as well as a stick figure (manikin). Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible whenever they saw one of the brands by moving the manikin towards or away from it. Participants were further asked to adhere to four guidelines. First, they should approach the brand that they just indicated that they liked the most (or the least, for participants who started with an incompatible stimulus-response mapping block) by moving the manikin towards it. Second, they should avoid the brand that they just indicated that they liked the least (or the most for participants who started with an incompatible stimulus-response mapping block) by moving the manikin away from it. Third, they should imagine themselves to be the manikin while performing the actions and finally, they should respond as quickly as possible to the brands without making too many mistakes. Participants completed one compatible and one incompatible response-mapping block, each consisting of 41 trials. Block order was counterbalanced across participants. Consistent with , each trial consisted of the presentation of the manikin in either the upper or the lower half of the screen, followed by the presentation of a stimulus (Brand 3/6) after 750ms.
After participants pressed the appropriate key, the manikin moved up or down the screen (towards or away from the stimulus). Participants had to press the key three times to gradually move the manikin all the way across the screen. The screen turned black 50ms after the third response. The inter-trial interval was 1000ms. If participants made an incorrect response, an error message appeared immediately after the first key press for 500ms.
Additional questions. After the evaluative measures, additional questions were asked.
First, to ensure that the cues acquired the same meaning as we expected, a question probing for contextual cue meaning was administered. We also assessed whether people relied on the cues when evaluating the Pokémon or Brand and whether their responses were based on demand compliance (e.g., "you just indicated that you either liked or disliked the various
brands. On what did you base your responses: (a) what I learned during the experiment, (b) on what I thought the researcher wanted me to say, (c) on some other factor than what I learned or what the researcher wanted me to say, (d) I don't know").
In Experiment 3, after participants were informed that the experiment was over, they were presented with six small boxes that were identical in shape, size, and color, each with the name of one brand printed on the top. As a reward for participating, they were offered the opportunity to select three "samples" of the brand products to take home with them. After participants made their choice they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Analytic Strategy. A series of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVAs)
and post-hoc t-tests were carried out on the self-reported ratings, IAT, IRAP, and approachavoidance scores (dependent variables). Our analyses had two goals: to determine if the valence of evaluative responding depended on the relationship established between (a) focal and valenced stimuli by the cues and (b) whether this valence would generalize from focal to non-focal stimuli (independent variables).
Data Preparation
Explicit and Implicit measures. We excluded the data from participants who (1) failed contextual cue training or relational training (Experiment 1: 2 participants; Experiment 2: 13 participants; Experiment 3: 13 participants; Experiment 4: 5 participants), (2) Table 1 ).
Finally, we examined whether the type of relationship established between stimuli (similarity vs. opposition) in Experiment 3 moderated evaluative responding. We first reverse scored ratings from the opposition condition and then compared them to those obtained in the similarity condition using a 2 (Relation Type: similarity vs. 
Evaluative Priming Task (Experiment 3). Submitting priming data to a 2 (Type of
Primes: Directly related to focal stimuli, indirectly related to focal stimuli) x 2 (Relation
Type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main or interaction effects (all ps > .2).
Behavioral Choice Task (Experiment 3). We defined a choice as being correct when
Brand 1, 2, and 3 were selected by those in the similarity condition and Brand 4, 5, and 6
were selected by those in the opposition condition (the selection of any other combination of brands was defined as an incorrect choice). Seventeen participants did not take part in the task. Of the remaining seventy-nine participants, sixty three (80%) selected all three correct brands in-line with what they learned during relational training while the other sixteen (20%) made a partially correct response (selecting one or two of the correct options). Participants selected the three correct brands significantly more often than would be expected by chance, exact binomial p (one-tailed) < .001.
Approach-avoidance task (Experiment 4). If relational training was successful then
we should observe an approach tendency towards Brand 3 and an avoidance tendency towards Brand 6. Participants' mean approach-avoidance task latencies were submitted to a one-tailed paired t-test. We observed a significant difference between latencies in compatible 
Discussion
Experiments 1-4 provide evidence for symbolic evaluative generalization. Participants first learned that a focal stimulus was symbolically similar to several non-focal stimuli. The focal stimulus was then paired with, but actually related as opposite (Experiments 1-3) or similar to (Experiment 4), positive or negative images. When participants learned that a Pokémon character or Brand was opposite to positive images they rated that character (and symbolically related characters) negatively. Yet when a Pokémon or Brand was opposite to negative images that character (and symbolically related characters) was rated positively.
These effects were observed on explicit ratings, implicit evaluations measures (IAT and IRAP, but not evaluative priming task), and a measure of automatic approach-avoidance tendencies. Experiment 3 also found that symbolic relations biased decision making:
participants selected the non-focal brands during a choice test even though they had never been directly related with valenced events in the past.
Experiments 5-6
In Experiments 5 and 6 we set out to show that our procedures can also be used to study the impact of symbolic relations on the magnitude of liking. Towards this end, cue training was modified to establish two symbols as meaning 'More than' and 'Less than'.
These cues were then used to generate a comparative relation comprised of five prizes (Prize 1 < 2 < 3 < 4 < 5). During a later phase, participants learned that they would receive a small 'prize' for taking part and that by selecting the first stimulus in the above relation (Prize 1) their prize money would increase by 1 cent. Selecting the second stimulus (Prize 2) allowed them to increase their earnings by either 25 cents (Experiment 5) or 1 euro (Experiment 6).
Thereafter, self-report, implicit, and behavioral choice measures were administered.
We anticipated three outcomes. First, self-reported ratings should increase linearly as a function of a stimulus' location within the relation. Stimuli which were never paired with money (Prizes 3, 4, and 5) should be evaluated more positively than stimuli which reliably and consistently increased prize winnings (Prize 1 or Prize 2). Second, this linear increase in evaluation should also be evident at the implicit level. Third, training a small number of relations may cause people to 'act as if' those stimuli are related in several untrained ways, and it is this learning process (known as 'arbitrarily applicable relational responding' in the learning psychology literature) that underpins symbolic evaluative generalization effects (for more see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016a) . In Experiment 5, we exposed participants to a relational test to determine if directly training a small number of relations would cause them to 'derive' or infer that stimuli were related in a number of novel and untrained ways. Procedure. The study consisted of three phases: cue training, relational training, and evaluative measures. In Experiment 6 all participants completed two sessions of cue and relational training rather than one.
Contextual Cue Training.
Training was similar to that used in Experiments 1-4.
However, this time, one symbol was trained to mean 'More than' and a second as 'Less than'.
Two pictures were presented at the top of the screen and two symbols on the bottom. To ensure that quantity -and not some other property -was the dimension along which the stimuli were related, a red circle was used as a discriminative stimulus for cue selection.
Specifically, when presented with (a) an image of a red circle containing many items and (b) an image with a smaller number of items not in a circle, selecting the 'More than' cue was reinforced and the 'Less than' symbol was punished. The opposite pattern of responding was required on trials designed to establish the second symbol as meaning 'Less than'.
Specifically, selecting the 'Less than' cue was reinforced when the picture containing the smaller number of items was enclosed in a red circle and the picture containing the larger number of items was not surrounded by a circle. Although training began with stimuli that were physically related to one another the task subsequently used stimuli that were not physically related so that participants could learn that quantity was the dimension they should attend to. Participants could only progress once they met training and testing criteria.
Relational Training. A single comparative relation consisting of five nonsense words was generated using a similar procedure as in cue training (i.e. Prize 1 < 2 < 3 < 4 < 5) (see In Experiment 6, automatic evaluative responding was assessed within rather than between participants using three "shortened" IATs, each comprised of five blocks (20 trials per practice block and 30 trials per test block).
Self-Report ratings of Prizes 2, 3, and 4 were assessed using a scale rating from -50 (negative) to +50 (positive) with 0 as a neutral point. A similar set of cue meaning and demand compliance questions was administered as before.
Questions. The same questions were used as in the previous studies. In Experiment 6 a behavioral choice task was also included to determine if the symbolic relations would impact decision making and selection judgments. Similar to Experiment 3, participants were presented with three identically shaped and sized boxes (with the names of Prizes 2, 3, and 4 printed on top) and asked to select one to add to their total prize earnings. Third, the time at which the relational test and behavioral choice tasks were administered was counterbalanced to determine if they had an influence on self-reported and IAT performance.
Results
9 Although this pass criterion was lower than that typically seen in the learning psychology literature (100%), we have found that responding with at least 80% accuracy provides a useful means of distinguishing between participants who 'act-as-if' stimuli are symbolically related versus those who do not (see . It also shortens the overall number of training blocks encountered and thus time taken to complete the task.
Data Preparation. Participant exclusion.
We excluded the data from participants who (1) failed contextual cue training or relational training (Experiment 5: 13 participants;
Experiment 6: 4 participants), (2) did not return for the second session of training (Experiment 6: 1 participant), or (3) had incomplete data due to a computer error (Experiment 5: 4 participants; Experiment 6: 2 participants). This led to the removal of 17 and 7
participants from Experiments 5-6 respectively, and a final sample of 64 and 36 in those respective cases. Finally, one participant in both Experiments 5 and 6 indicated that they were demand compliant. Removing their data did not significantly influence the reported findings.
Thus their data were retained for subsequent analysis. Behavioral Choice Task (Experiment 6). Participants were provided with the option to choose one of three stimuli. We defined a choice as correct when Prize 4 was selected and incorrect when Prize 2 or 3 was selected. Overall, twenty six participants (72%) selected the correct stimulus while ten did not (28%). Participants selected the correct prize significantly more often than would be expected by chance, exact binomial p (one-tailed) < .01.
Discussion
Using our symbolic generalization procedures, we were able to demonstrate that symbolically relations can also influence the magnitude of evaluative generalization effects.
Results revealed that the magnitude of evaluative transfer depended on the location of stimuli in the symbolic comparative relation. Despite being the only item that consistently and reliably increased the amount of money people received, Prize 2 was liked less than Prize 3 while Prize 3 was liked less than Prize 4. A linear increase in automatic stimulus evaluation was also evident, such that Prize 4 was preferred to 3 or 2.
General Discussion
Evaluations can be formed or changed whenever people encounter regularities in their environment, such as the repeated presentation of a single stimulus (mere exposure), pairing of stimuli (evaluative conditioning), or whenever behavior is linked to its consequences (approach-avoidance) (see De Houwer, 2009 ). These newly formed or changed (focal) stimulus evaluations can then be transmitted to non-focal stimuli in situations where the former shares some perceptual or symbolic relation with the latter. This phenomenon (evaluative generalization) may explain how likes and dislikes come to exert a powerful and far-reaching impact on behavior.
At the conceptual level, we argue that strong evidence for symbolic evaluative generalization requires not only that changes in liking are observed, but also that focal and non-focal stimuli bear no physical similarity to one another, and that the change in liking for non-focal stimuli cannot be explained in terms of direct or indirect spatio-temporal relations between stimuli (i.e., conditioning). Until now few procedures existed that were capable of meeting the above criteria. We therefore introduced a set of methods that are capable of doing so, and used them to obtain repeated evidence for symbolic evaluative generalization effects.
Specifically, we observed changes in liking even though (a) all three stimuli in the symbolic relation were physically dissimilar to one another (which argues against perceptual generalization), (b) the valence of the focal stimulus was established only after it was related to non-focal stimuli (which argues against direct conditioning) and (c) the direction of the change in liking of the non-focal stimulus was opposite to the valence of the valenced stimuli with which it was indirectly related (which argues against indirect conditioning). In the following section, we consider how mental and functional theories account for these findings.
Symbolic Evaluative Generalization: A Theoretical Analysis
In addition to providing a conceptual, methodological, and empirical contribution to the literature on (symbolic) evaluative generalization, we believe that our results also have theoretical implications. There are two different levels at which to explain symbolic generalization effects (De Houwer, 2011; : (1) a mental level that aims to uncover the mental mechanisms that mediate the impact of the environment on liking and (2) a functional level that aims to describe those elements of the past and present environment that moderate evaluative responses. We turn our attention to these two levels of explanation.
Mental level of explanation. Much work on evaluative generalization has been carried out at the mental level of analysis where the goal is to identify the mental representations and processes that mediate between environment and (evaluative) behavior.
In what follows we consider how three broad classes of mental models (associative, propositional, and dual-process) accommodate our findings.
Associative mental models. Single process associative models represent a broad class of mental models that share a common property (the mental association) but which vary in their respective complexity (e.g., unidirectional vs. bidirectional associations). Although it is impossible to prove or disprove such a broad class of models (Miller & Escobar, 2001 ), our results do place some constraints on them. For instance, many of these models could accommodate the propagation of valence from one stimulus to another in equivalence relations by claiming that chains of associations were formed in memory between stimuli (e.g., between Pokémon 1  Positive Images; Pokémon 1  Pokémon 2  Pokémon 3). In our studies, however, we always established a linear chain of stimulus relations such that Stimulus 1 was related to Stimulus 2 which was then related to Stimulus 3. Only after this training was valence established for Stimulus 1. A change in valence from Stimulus 1 to 3 cannot occur via unidirectional associations because Stimulus 3 followed, rather than preceded the presentation of Stimulus 1 and 2. Thus bidirectional associations are needed (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2011; Elsner & Hommel, 2004 ). Yet even here the association formation mechanism must somehow be able to take into account the type of relation between stimuli (e.g., similarity, opposition, or comparison). For instance, during the training phase of Experiments 1-4, Pokémon or brand products were repeatedly paired with stimuli of one
valence and yet people subsequently acted as if those same Pokémon or brands had acquired the opposite valence. Likewise, in Experiments 1-6, certain stimuli were repeatedly paired with one another (e.g., Pokémon 1 and 5; Brand 2 and 4) and yet participants later acted as if those same stimuli were opposite to, or greater than, one another in valence or value.
Although we do not exclude the possibility that some single process associative models can model how stimuli are related rather than merely associated, our findings do seem to challenge many currently available models (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Pearce & Hall, 1980) . In short, although some future associative model might account for our data, our results constrain current and future associative models of symbolic evaluative generalization.
More specifically, a successful associative model of our findings should not only allow for bidirectional associations but also for an impact of different types of relational information.
Propositional models. The current data fit well with propositional models that involve qualified links between mental representations in memory. Whereas associations convey only the strength with which representations are linked, propositions can specify the structure of stimulus relations (e.g., 'X is opposite to Y' or 'X is larger than Y'). Likewise, while associations gradually develop with many experienced pairings, propositions can be rapidly formed on the basis of experience, instructions, inference, or deductive reasoning (De Houwer, 2009 , 2014 . When combined, these two properties of propositions may account for the current set of findings.
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In Experiments 1-3, cue training likely gave rise to propositions about the two symbols (e.g., "This symbol means that the pictures are the same whereas that symbol means they are opposite"). Relational training may have resulted in the formation of propositions about a small set of directly trained relations (e.g., "Pokémon 1 is the same as Pokémon 2", "Pokémon 2 is the same as Pokémon 3" and "Pokémon 1 is the opposite of positive images").
Participants may have then generated a set of novel propositions about relationships that were never explicitly trained (e.g., "Pokémon 3 is bad and Pokémon 6 is good"). It was these inferred (rather than the directly trained) propositions that may have mediated self-reported responses to the focal and non-focal stimuli. In other words, a series of propositions based on direct stimulus relating may not have been enough -rather these propositions may have to
give rise to additional propositions in order to produce the expected generalization effects.
It is often assumed that the formation of propositions depends not only on awareness of the to-be-related stimuli but also the cognitive resources, time, and motivation to relate those stimuli (De Houwer, 2009 ). Although we did not manipulate these factors it could be argued that all necessary preconditions for the formation of propositions were fulfilled during cue and relational training phases of our experiments. Our findings are also consistent with a growing body of work showing that (once formed) propositions may be activated automatically from memory and guide the evaluation of stimuli on self-report and automatic measures alike (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, 2014) . For example, once the inferred proposition "Prize 4 is more than Prize 1" was generated it may have been stored in memory and retrieved automatically during testing.
Dual-process models. Finally, dual-process accounts that allow for rules (Smith & DeCoster, 2000) , judgments (Kahneman, 2003) , and propositions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014) to feed into and create novel associations could account for our findings -provided that certain pre-conditions are met. For instance, and similar to the above propositional model, cue training may have given rise to propositions concerning the meaning of the two symbols. These propositions could have been used during relational training to generate additional propositions about the stimulus relations themselves. This set of "directly trained" propositions could subsequently give rise to inference-based propositions about stimuli that were never paired together. These latter propositions could have been subsequently transformed into and stored as associations in memory (explaining the outcomes observed in Experiments 1-6).
To some extent, it is unsurprising that, as a category, dual-process models can account for our results at least as well as single-process propositional models. For any version of a single-process propositional model, one could simply add an associative system to create a dual-process model that explains at least as much as that single-process propositional model.
Hence, the real value of dual-process models needs to be evaluated on the basis of what it adds to models that include only one of the processes. Our findings require dual process models to articulate how, when, and why (a) the cue and relational training procedures give rise to propositions, (b) novel propositions will emerge based on a set of directly trained propositions, and (c) how these propositions are subsequently transformed into and stored as associations given that participants were never exposed to any training or instructions to do They suggest that generalization may not be a simple perceptual phenomenon as often thought, at least when it comes to organisms with access to the symbolic learning pathway.
Rather, generalization effects may represent instances of a more general class of behaviors known as 'relational responses' (i.e., responses that involve responding to one stimulus in terms of another). Whereas many species learn to respond to one stimulus based on its physical similarity or difference to another stimulus, humans gain access to a second, more 'advanced', type of (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding early in their development.
The ability to learn and behave in this way effectively unshackles humans from the physical world and allows them to relate stimuli in ways that do not depend on their physical commonalities but that are under the control of contextual cues in the environment. conditioning, persuasion, and mere exposure) and non-focal stimuli (e.g., in generalization procedures such as those used above) may be instances of symbolic relational behavior.
Open Questions and Future Directions
The non-focal evaluations were perhaps weaker than their self-reported counterparts, and is a topic worth of future investigation. Finally, one reviewer pointed out that our manipulation required participants to first infer the meaning of the contextual cues and then repeatedly relate stimuli in an effortful way. The training phase may have allowed them to 'figure out' the purpose of the task and thus based their evaluative responses on what they thought the researchers wanted to find (demand) and not what they actually thought or felt. Although possible, we found that only a fraction of participants reported that they were demand compliant in the six experiments. Even if one were to dismiss self-reported ratings as evidence of demand we still observed changes in liking on IATs, IRAPs, approachavoidance, and behavioral choice tasks. Thus the likelihood that the reported findings are purely demand seems rather low. Nevertheless, future work could replicate our findings while controlling for demand in other ways (e.g., employ a cover story or a measure impervious to demand).
Conclusion
In this paper we offer a unique set of procedures that allows for the study of symbolic evaluative generalization in a way that controls for perceptual similarity and direct pairings while also allowing for the manipulation of relation type between stimuli. We introduced the method, showed that it leads to the generalization of explicit and implicit evaluations, and does so in a way that depends on the type of relation between focal and valenced stimuli. For those operating at the functional level of analysis, such effects seem to represent instances of (arbitrarily applicable) relational responding. For those operating at the mental level, our Priming. Evaluative Priming data was first screened for outliers. Trials on which the target was incorrectly classified (3.8%) or with reaction times below 300ms or greater than 1000ms (3.4%) were excluded. Two priming scores were calculated, one for the brands directly related to a focal stimulus (Brand 2 and Brand 4) and another for the brands indirectly related to the focal stimulus (Brand 3 and Brand 6). This was achieved by
